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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ET AL., 
Respondents, 
-vs.-
UTAH LIQUOR CO·NTRO·L COM-
MISSION, ET AL., 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S1TATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9207 
The respondent agrees with the statement of fact~ 
as contained in appellant's brief. 
STATE1fENT OF POINTS 
POIN'T I 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJECT 
TO SUIT FOR VIO·LATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY ZON-
ING REGULATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ;TITLE 
17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, AS IT APPLIES TO VIOLATION OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF TIT'LE 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, AS 
AMENDED. 
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POINT II 
THE APP AREN'T CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROVI-
, .. " 
SIONS OF TITLE 32~1-28 AND 'TITLE 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE LATTER, IT 
BEING THE MOS'T RECENT EXPRESSIO·N OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE. 
POINT III 
HAVING FAILED TO ~co~MPLY WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF TITLE 17-27-8, U;C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED, THE 
USE OF T'HE LAND AND BUILDINGS IN QUES'TION BY 
THE LIQUOR •CONTROL COMMISSION IS ENJOINABLE, 
AND 'THE TRIAL COURT RULING DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTIO·N TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT HERE-
IN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
POINT IV 
·THE LIQUOR CONTROL COl\1!diSSION ACTS IN A PRO-
PRIETARY RATHER THAN A GOVERNMENTAL CAPA-




UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJECT 
TO SUIT FOR VIO·LATION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY ZON-
ING REGULATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 
17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, AS IT APPLIES TO VIOLATION OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, AS 
AMENDED. 
Title 1.7-27-23, lT.C.A., 1953, provides as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful to erect, construct, re-
construct, alter, maintain or use any building or 
structure or to use any land in violation of any 
regulation in, or any provision of, any zoning 
resolution, or any amendment thereof, enacted or 
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3 
adopted by any board of county commissioners 
under the authority of the act. Any person, firm 
or corporation violating any regulation in, or 
of any provision of, any zoning resolution, or any 
amendment of this act, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. In case any build~ng or structure i~s or 
is proposed to be erected, constructed, recon-
structed, altered, maintained or used, or any land 
is or is proposed to be used, in violation of this 
.act or of any reg~tlation or prqvision of any reso-
lution, or amend1nent thereof, ~enacted, or adopted 
by any board of county commiJssioners under the 
authority granted by this act, such board, the 
district atotrney of the ·county, or any owner of 
real estate within the district in which such build-
ing, structure or land is situated, may, in addi-
tion to other remedies provided by law, i'nsti·tute 
injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other 
appropriate action or actions, proceeding or pro-
ceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove such 
unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, 
alteration, maintenance or use." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
One of the provisions of the act to which the fore-
going section of the statute applies is Title 17-27-8, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, referred t1o by appellant in his 
brief in Point III, and set out as follows: 
"vVnenever any board of county commission-
ers shall have adopted an official map of the 
county or any part thereof, then and thenceforth 
no public road, park or other public way, ground, 
or space, no public building or structure, or no 
public utility, whether publicly or privately own-
ed, shall be constructed or authorized in the un-
incorporated territory of the county until and 
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unless the proposed location and extent thereof 
shall have been submitted to and approved by 
such county planning commission; provided, ho\r-
ever, that in case of disapproval, the said plan-
ning commission shall communicate its reasons 
to the board of county commissioners of the 
county in which the public way, ground, space, 
building, structure, or utility is proposed to be 
located; and such board shall have the power to 
overrule such disapproval by a vote of not less 
than a majority of its entire membership, and 
upon such overruling said board or other official 
in charge of proposed construction or authoriza-
tion may proceed therewith; provided further, 
however, that if the public way, ground, space, 
building, strttcture, or utility be one the authori-
zation or financing of which does not, under the 
law governing the same, fall within the province 
of the board of county commissioners or other 
county official or bo·ard, then the submission to 
the county planning commission shall be made. 
by the body or official having such juris,diction, 
and the saiJd planning commission's disapproval 
may be overruled by s.aid body by a vote of not 
less than a majority of its entire membership or 
by said official. The acceptance, widening, re-
moval, extension, relocation, narrowing, vacation, 
abandonment, change of use, acquisition of land 
for, or sale or lease of any road, park, or other 
public 'vay, ground, place, property, or structure 
shall be subject to sinrilar submission and ap-
proval, and the failure to approve 1nay be similar-
ly overruled. The failure of the commission to act 
within thirty days from and after the date of 
official submission to it shall be deemed approval 
unless a longer period be granted by the submit-
ting board, body or official." (Emphasis added.) 
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As pointed out by the appellant, this statutory pro-
vision has never been construed by this court. Further, 
an exhaustive search discloses no available record of 
the proceedings of the legislature from which its inten-
tion can be deter1nined. We are left, then, to determine 
the intended application of this statute by a bare analy-
sis of the words of the statute themselves. It is submitted 
that the phrase "body or official" in ~Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, must include state bodies, of which the 
Utah Liquor Control Commission is one. The provisions 
of Title 17-27-23 U.~c·.A., 1953, were obviously intended to 
provide remedies for the violation of all the preceeding 
sections of that chapter including Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, and are therefore applicable to the 
Liquor Control Commission. 
For authority to the effect that the legislature can, 
by specific statutory authorization, as here, make a 
state agency amenable to zoning regulations see 61 ALR 
2d, 970, Sec. 8, at page 987, which discusses that point and 
begins with the following language: 
"It has been recognized that a governmental 
project may be made subject to zoning regulations 
by the express authorization of the agency estab-
lishing it." 
That annotation relies largely on the ca.se of Alabama 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. CiJty of Birming-
ham, 253 Ala. 402, 44 So. 2d 593, wherein the City of 
Binningham pursuant to a statute authorizing zoning 
of liquor stores by cities, threatened to enforce criminal 
sanctions against the managers of certain liquor stores 
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for the operation thereof in violation of local zoning 
ordinances. In that case the court found the zoning ordi-
nance invalid for reasons not p·ertinent here, but said at 
page 598': 
"While we recognize that the operation of 
the liquor store is a governmental function, this 
is no reason why the legislature cannot provide 
that the liquor store may be included within a zon-
ing ordinance. A liquor store is a place where 
alcoholic beverages are placed on sale and sold to 
customers as in other stores, and for this reason 
from the standpoint of zoning could well be re-
garded as a business 'vithin the statute which au-
thorizes a city to be divided into business, indus-
trial and residential zones." 
We do not agree 'vith appellant's conclusion that the 
Liquor Control Commission is not within the definition 
of a person, fir1n, or corporation. It is pointed out, how-
ever, that while the misdemeanor provision of Title 17-
27-23, U.C.A., 1953, apply to persons, firms and corpora-
tions, the other remedies in that same statute, including 
the remedy of injunctive relief as here requested, do not 
refer to persons, firms, or corporations. 
Moreover, respondent submits that the buildings 
in question are "public buildings" for the purposes of 
Title 17-27-8, lT.C.A., 1953, for the reason that they are 
used for public or quasi-public purposes, and as such are 
subject to Salt Lake County zoning regulations. Public 
buildings are defined in the case of Sharp et al v. Police 
J1~;ry of Parish of East Baton Rouge, 194 La. 220, 193 So. 
594, as follo·w·s : 
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'~ 'Public Building. In a narrow sense a "pub-
lic building, is a building erPcte( 1 and owned by 
state, county or municipal authorities; a building 
owned or controlled and held by the public au-
thorities for public use~ a building belonging to, 
or used by, the public for the transaction of public 
or quasi-public business. As so defined the term 
H public building" includes a high school building, 
a hospital, a jail, a town calaboose, or a common 
schoolhouse. 
''In a broader sense it is defined as a build-
ing, which, although privately owned, may be fair-
ly deemed to promote a public purpose or to sub-
serve a public use ; a building where the public 
congregates in considerable numbers either for 
amusement or for other purposes.' . . ." Citing 50 
Corpus Juris, page 850 et seq. 
Respondent submits that the building in question 
is used for the transaction of public business and also as a 
place open to the public wherein the public congregates. 
POINT II 
THE .APP AREN'T CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROVI-
SIONS OF TITLE 32-1-28 AND TITLE 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE LATTER, IT 
BEING THE lVIOS'T RECENT EXPRESSION OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE. 
The lTtah Legislature enacted the Liquor Control 
... \rt in 1935. (See Session La\Ys, 1935, Chapter 43.) The 
present 'Tit1e 3~-1-28, U.C.A., 1953, was included in the 
Liquor Control _..\et of 1935, as Section 30 of Chapter 43, 
Ses~~d on La\YS, 1935. 
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In 1941 the Utal1legislature delegated to the various 
counties the power to zone. Title 17-27-23 U.C.A., 1953, 
was originally enacted as Session Laws, 1941, Chapter 23, 
Section 23. 
Respondent submits that since Title 17-27-23, U.C.A., 
1953, is the latest pronouncement by the Utah legislature, 
it should take precedence over Title 32-1-28, U.C.A., 1953, 
insofar as this action is concerned. ·c·ertainly the Utah 
legislature, in delegating the power to zone to the various 
counties in 1941, and providing for injunctive relief for 
violation of a county zoning ordinance and regulation, 
was aware of the fact that the Utah Liquor Control Com-
mission operated and would in the future operate stores 
in the various counties. Were the legislature to exempt 
state agencies, including the Liquor Control Commission 
from the operation of Title 17-27-23, U.C.A., 1953, it could 
have expressly done so and provided for such exemption 
in the statute upon the premise that the Liquor ·Control 
Commission enjoys sovereign immunity. Respondent sub-
mits that its failure to do so however, must be considered 
as an indication that the legislature did not intend to ex-
empt state agencies from the operation of Title 17-27-23, 
U.C.A., 1953; and further that the Liquor Commission is 
n'ot free from suit under this statute on the basis that it 
enjoys sovereign immunity. 
That the Liquor Control Commission does not enjoy 
freedom from suit under the concept of sovereign im-
munity has been expressly declared by the Legislature 
in Title 32-1-28, U.C.A., 1953. App·ellant contends, on 
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pages ten and eleven of appellant's brief, that compliance 
\rith this statute is 1nandatory for standing to sue, and 
further that the statute is exclusive and provides the 
only means \Vhereby the Liquor Control ·Commission 
is subject to suit. Yet a liberal reading of the statute 
does not carry with it such a restrictive meaning. !Title 
32-1-28, 1T.C.A., 1953, provides that, ... "the tax commis-
Rion ntay \Vith the \Vritten consent of the governor be 
sued .... " If the legislature had intended to provide that 
this statute establish the sole and exclusive means of 
~uit, 'vords carrying that meaning would have been em-
ployed, such as the words "shall only," "upon condition 
that" or "must." Howeve-r, words of this type are not 
to be found, and the Legislature has instead used the 
\vord ~'may" which, under the general rules of statutory 
construction, is held to be directory and not mandatory. 
(See Words and Phrases, Vol. 26A, "May-In Statutes, 
.A.uthorizing Suits, page 428, citing Isom v. Rex Crude 
Oil Co., 140 Cal. 678, 74 Pac. 294). To hold that the stat-
ute is exclusive \vould vest the Liquor Control Commis-
sion \vith the power to pick and choose the cases it would 
defend, if any, and "rould give it the status of having 
sovereign i1nn1unity, thereby rendering Title 32-1-28, 
lT.-C.A., 1953, n1eaningless and of no import. This result, 
re~pondent urges, \Vas not intended by the Legislature. 
Respondent submits that the two statutes in question 
are in direct conflict as to whether or not the appellant 
is subject to suit, and if so, in what manner. Respondent 
urges that the legislature in 19-±1 had knowledge of that 
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portion of the Liquor Control Act here in question, (Title 
32-1-28, U:c·.A., 1953) and as such could have exempted 
the appellant frorn the operation of Title 17-27-23, U.C.A., 
1953. As was stated in the case of Hudson Furniture 
Co. 1J. Freed Furniture & Carpet Co., 10 Utah 31, 36 Pac. 
132, 133: 
"It is clear that the two sections are repug-
nant to each other in this respect, and, as section 
3918 is the latest expression of our legislature, 
it must prevail; and in so far as the two statutes 
are repugnant to each other, the former is re~ 
pealed by the latter by implication. The fact that 
the former is not expressly repealed by the latter, 
and is our regular statute of frauds, as insisted 
by counsel for appellant, makes no difference .... 
Both statutes must be construed together, and 
given effect as far as possible, for both are pre~ 
sumed to have been enacted \vith deliberation, 
and with a lmowledge of all existing la\vs on that 
subject." Citing Sutherland Statutory Construc-
tion, Sections 152, 160, and cases. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court stated in the case 
of In Re Gannett, 11 Utah 283, 39 Pac. 496, 497: 
"The repeal by implication results from an 
enactment the terms of \Yhich are in conflict with 
an earlier act, and the necessary operation of 
which cannot be han11onized \vith the necessary 
effect of the later la"T· In such case the last ex-
pression of the legislative "Till n1ust prevail." Cit-
ing Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section 
138, and cases. 
Although respondent does not contend that Title 3~-
1-28 U.C.A., 1953, is repealed by implication, respondent 
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does submit that the latest pronouncement of the Legis-
lature controls for the purposes of this suit. As such, 
respondent need not comply with the provisions of Title 
32-1-28 U.C.A., 1953, in order to maintain its action, but 
the appellant is subject to suit under Title 17-27-23, 
U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT III 
HAVING FAILED TO CO,MPL Y WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF TITLE 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED, THE 
USE OF THE LAND AND BUILDINGS IN QUES'TION BY 
THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS ENJOINABLE, 
AND THE TRIAL COURT RULING DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S COMPLAIN'T HERE-
IN SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The Legislature in Title 17-27-8, U. C.A., 1953, as 
amended, has provided a clear procedure wherein the 
county planning commission and other political bodies, 
including the Liquor ·Control Commission, can express 
their intents and desires concerning land use to the end 
that said bodies can coop·erate to serve the people whom 
they both represent, and has left the decision in the end 
to the body most concerned with the problem. Appellant 
has fully ignored this procedure. It has neither requested 
approval of its location of the planning commission nor 
has it, so far as this record shows, taken a vote of its 
membership to overrule the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission. It now asks this court to say that because 
it has wholly ignored the planning commission and these 
statutory provisions, we should now infer a compliance 
"Tith the provisions of Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, from this conduct. But this lack of recognition 
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is the very matter of which the county now complains. 
Had the same result obtained after compliance with the 
statute, the county would not and could not now complain. 
We now request this court to require specific compliance 
with that statute to the end that the ~c·ounty Planning 
Commission can at least advise appellant of its deciSion, 
and the appellant can then make its determination to 
comply with, or· overrule, the Planning Commission. In 
this action it is not respondent's intent or desire to en-
croach upon or interfere with the sovereign power of the 
state of Utah. However, it is respondent's intent tore-
quire the Liquor Control Commission, as an agency and 
creature of the state, to comply with the laws of this 
state, to-wit: Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
POINT IV 
THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION kCTS IN A PRO-
PRIETARY RATHER THAN A GOVERNMENTAL CAPA-
CITY, AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO ZONING REGU-
LATIONS. 
Respondent recognizes that the ,,~eight of authority 
favors the determination that the Liquor Control Com-
mission acts in a governmental capacity. Se·e 121 ALR 
300 and 9 ALR 2d 1292. It is suggested ho,vever, that 
this determination has been made largely to support the 
constitutionality of the act as against the contention 
that it is a monopolistic invasion of private enterprise. 
The ease of Utah ;,llfrs.' Ass'n. v. Steu~art., 82 Utah 198, 
23 Pac. 2d 229, is an exan1ple of this determination, as 
are many of the cases in the annotations cited above .. On 
the other hand, the operation of the liquor con1mission 
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13 
has many characteristics of a typical private business 
enterprise. It operates for a profit; it operates in general 
as a retail store serving the public at large. In this re-
gard it should be noted that the expansion of its opera-
tion in question here represents not an effort to control 
or limit liquor consumption, but in fact encourages it. 
In this respect the commission has reacted much as a 
private entrepreneur desiring to increase its salP~. 
It is submitted now for your consideration that for 
purposes of a1nenability to zoning regulation, and pos-
sibly for purposes of tort liability, the op·eration of retail 
liquor stores by the Liquor Control Commission should 
be determined to be a proprietary functi'on. 
Under the view of respondent herein, this determina-
tion would not change the net result of this case, inas-
much as Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 1953, would still apply. 
It should be noted, however, that if it is determined that 
in the operati'on of its retail liquor stores the Liquor 'Con-
trol Commission acts in a proprietary capacity, and at 
the same time that the provisions ·of Title 17-27-8, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, are not applicable as contended in part 
by appellant, then the result should be that the Liquor 
Control Commission would be barred from op·erating 
in conflict with county zoning ordinances according to 
the view that proprietary functions of political bodies 
are subject to zoning regulations. See 61 ALR 2d 970. 
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CON,CLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, respondent submits 
that the trial court did not commit error in denying ap-
pellant's motion to dismiss. Respondent respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the decision of the District 
Court and allow this matter to be tried on the merits. 
GROVER A. GILE.S 
Salt Lake County Atto~ney 
GERALD E. NIELSON, 
Deputy, Civil DiviJsvon 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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